Introduction
Human security is a concept in which foreign policy revolves around
people. These people’s rights, safety, and lives must be protected from
threats. Such protection ensures long-term stability. [1] The human security
agenda (HSA) is the pragmatic application of this idea, and favours the
security of people rather than the security of state. [2]
In The Limits of the Human
Security Agenda, T. S. Hataley and Richard Nossal concluded that although
the HSA is successful in theory, much difficulty has been encountered when
trying to bring it into practice. [2] An example of this is Canadian foreign
policy in the 1990s and how it related to the East Timor Crisis.
The
Problem
In 1975, Indonesia had invaded East Timor, and for almost 25 years, Indonesian
paramilitary ruled via violence and human rights abuse. [3] In August 1999, a
vote was held in East Timor for independence. Up to and throughout the voting
procedure, however, violent paramilitary activity increased in an effort to
discourage voting and postpone elections. [3]
Ultimately, more than 75% of the population voted for this independence,
and in October, the vote was ratified by the Indonesian legislature. [3] In
response, Jakarta declared martial law, sparking a paramilitary rampage that
included murder, rape, and pillage. [3] Attention of this abomination was then brought to the
international community so that it would intervene in this crisis. One of the
nations that responded was Canada.
Canadian
Foreign Policy and Response
During the 1990s, the HSA was centric to Canadian foreign policy. [2]
This effort was spearheaded by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy.
Axworthy had a negative response towards the East Timor Crisis and, under the
HSA, vouched for Canadian involvement in East Timor as part of an international
peacekeeping force, International Force East Timor (INTERFET). [2]
On September 7th, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that Canada
only be willing to commit a small force of peacekeepers. Chrétien claimed this
force would consist of 600 troops, receiving criticism for the apparent
insufficiency of troops. However, he had used the term ‘troops’ synonymously with ‘personnel’, which can refer to the collective military instead of just the
infantry ground forces.
Canada’s actual force would include: [1]
> 250 naval personnel
> 100 aircrew
> 50 logistical and medical support
> 200 infantry
On September 15th, the United Nations Security Council’s approval of Resolution 1264 (1999) [PDF] allowed Canada to
effectuate its contribution. [1] However, the Canadian military would only
arrive on October 27th, 1999 – much later than the Australian force, which had
come on September 20th, 1999. [1]
The
Application of the HSA
Ultimately, Canada’s experience in the East Timor Crisis shows that the
HSA does not necessarily provide a good foundation for Canadian foreign policy.
Not only was Canada very slow to respond and had few personnel to deploy, but
it did not establish itself as a major contributor. More insight can be gained
upon examination of the administration at the time.
Chrétien’s attitude as Prime Minister greatly slowed down the extent to
which the HSA was applied. Although Axworthy was arguably supportive of the
strategy (as can be deduced from his emotional response to the crisis), he was
never able to convince Chrétien to integrate the HSA into his politics. This is
evident from the small size of the force Chrétien deployed to East Timor.
However, one might ask, why would Chrétien even agree to deploy personnel to
East Timor given his lack of interest in the HSA as well as his general
reluctance to utilize military force?
It is important to understand that Chrétien’s decision to send 600
personnel to East Timor was based three important factors. [4] The first is the
‘CNN effect’ which is a theory
that the Cable News Network (CNN) has had a
large impact on certain nations’ foreign policies via its (sensational)
reporting of events. [1] Furthermore, many non-governmental organizations
lobbied the government and informed citizens of the human rights abuses. [1]
Finally, the international community had operatives in East Timor and was
concerned for their safety. [1]
In reality, it appears that Chrétien’s choice was actually a public
matter rather than a legitimate concern for human security. To me, the Canadian
experience in East Timor seems to decry the efficiency of the HSA. However, as
is clear from the analysis, its application depends on the ruling Canadian
administration, and so the HSA could potentially be successful under a Prime
Minister other than Chrétien.
Machiavelli’s
Return
Could Chrétien’s policy have been based on Machiavelli’s ideas? By
deploying troops to East Timor and by appealing to the public’s demand of human
rights enforcement, Chrétien was possibly making a good image of himself and
Canada. This can be expanded by his announcement to send 600 troops – a feat
that would have made Canada a much larger contributor than it was. However,
this Machiavellian tactic of appearing humane (see The President’s Princedom) wasn’t
necessarily successful, as it met much criticism. For example, Reform Party
defence critic Art Hanger said:
“The prime minister is picking numbers from his hat
and making outrageous promises to bolster his own ego on the world stage …” [5]
Chrétien was also trying to make himself look good in a way that would
involve Canada less than was necessary. Referring to the delay of the Canadian
military’s arrival, Hataley and Nossal theorize that Canada was attempting to
minimize its casualties and was waiting for other INTERFET contributors to scope
out East Timor before its arrival. [2] Overall, I find that this shows the
potential use of the HSA as a tool of realism under the discipline of
Machiavelli, rather than a guiding idealistic principle.
Sources
[1] Michaud, Nelson. Ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. “Values
and Canadian Foreign Policy-making: Inspiration or Hindrance?” Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic
Debates and New Ideas. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007: 344.
[2] T.S. Hataley and Kim Richard Nossal. “The Limits of the Human
Security Agenda: The Case of Canada’s Response to the Timor Crisis.” Global Change, Peace & Security 16,
no. 1 (2004): 6-17.
[4]
Robinson, Geoffrey. “If You Leave Us, We Will Die.” Dissent (Winter 2002), 89; as found in [1].
[5] CTV-TV. “The Continuing Violence in East Timor.” National News (13 September 1999); as
found in [1].
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