Human Security Agenda: Africa's World War

Preface

In 1994, the Rwandan Genocide occurred. Conflict persisted between the two major ethnicities in Rwanda at the time – the Hutu (~85%) and the Tutsi (~14%). [1] The Tutsi population was used as a scapegoat by the Hutus, and was blamed for all of Rwanda’s national problems. [1] On April 6th, 1994, a plane carrying the Hutu Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down, sparking violence. [1] The Rwandan Genocide lasted until mid-July, and by then, 800 000 Tutsis had died as well as many Hutus. [1]

Congo: Africa’s World War

Many refugees and rebels escaped into the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). [2] Such rebels, who were supported by Rwanda and Uganda, began conquering Congo. Many more conflicts plagued the region, such as the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003), whose effects are still being experienced today. [2] The largest guerrilla army that emerged amidst this struggle was the Hutu-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR). In opposition emerged the government-supported National Congress for the Defence of the People (NCDP), a Tutsi-based militia supported by Rwanda. Now allied with the government, it is demobilizing into a political party.

Since the Rwandan Genocide, the people of the DRC have been subject to human rights abuses by both sides of the conflict. Essentially, the population has become the battlefield, being subject to violence, murder, pillage and rape on a daily basis. Citizens are also prone to starvation and disease. [3] The turmoil in the DRC has resulted in more deaths than in Afghanistan and Iraq combined, and yet, it is one of top underreported humanitarian crises of 2009. The international community, spearheaded by the United Nations, has responded to this and is making an effort in attempting to halt the crisis.

Canadian Foreign Policy and Response

The Canadian response to the Congolese crisis has been economic, military and social.

Over the decade, Canada has contributed $237,000,000.00 and currently contributes finances at a rate of $33,000,000.00 per year.

Furthermore, the Canadian military operation in the DRC is Operation Crocodile, which consists of 440 military personnel. This operation is Canada’s role in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), whose overall purpose is to establish peace in the DRC. [4]

Finally, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has established developmental relations with the DRC, stating its six objectives to be [5]:

> Democratic Governance

> Private Sector Development

> Health

> Basic Education

> Equality between Men and Women

> Environmental Sustainability

It is also interesting to note that Canadian Governor-General Michaëlle Jean has visited Congo in her Africa tour to discuss sexual violence. [6]

The Return of the Human Security Agenda (HSA)

Looking at the Canadian response, notice how much money Canada has spent and is spending annually. This amounts to a large quantity of finances, and implies there must be an underlying goal in Canadian policy that accompanies its superficial moralpolitik in play at Congo. In our realistic world, it would be impractical to spend so much on an idealistic goal.

In terms of military action, there has been much discussion over Canada’s role in the DRC. Indeed, the UN recently asked Canada to lead MONUC, and this debate had been taken to Ottawa, where Parliament was debating whether Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie will command the 20,000-soldier force. Canada, however, declined, citing its involvement in Afghanistan until 2011. [7] It received much political criticism for this. Perhaps Canada has not yet achieved its realistic goals there and is not yet prepared to concentrate on the DRC for the same purposes.

Upon examination of CIDA’s six goals, don’t they seem a little idealistic? Doesn’t it also seem perhaps a little too erroneous for the present situation in the DRC? Surely, the introduction of systems like democratic governance and basic education can only be sustainable after military conflict has subsided, or else they would be constantly threatened and likely destroyed. Until the war ceases, CIDA’s goals should be put on hold.

And why is Governor-General Michaëlle Jean touring Africa and discussing humanitarian issues? Perhaps the goal is to make Canada seem more involved in the humanitarian issues in the whole of Africa as well as make the Africans themselves aware that Canada is participating.

Another notable matter is the coltan-mining industry in the DRC. It is subject to much violence, as both the FDLR and the CNDP struggle to control it. [8] Coltan is a compound essential to the manufacturing of cell phones, and the DRC is the primary supplier of coltan world-wide. [8] As it turns out, Canada is the largest foreign investor in this industry. [9] It would not be surprising if Canada’s presence in Congo is partially due to its concerns with protecting its investments. This sheds some light onto the realistic nature of Canada’s role.

If we consolidate our facts, then it appears that Canada is indeed operating in Congo under the ideology of the HSA. Looking back at the East Timor Crisis (see Human Security Agenda: East Timor Crisis of 1999), Canada’s application of the HSA was a disaster. So why would Canada return to incorporating the HSA in its foreign policy?

In the big picture, Harper and Jean are doing exactly what Chrétien was doing – being Machiavellian leaders. However, they’re doing it better. This time, Canada has more money and personnel to contribute and is directly involving authority figures in human rights issues. Furthermore, Harper and Jean have more goals. Not only will Canada’s international recognition as a peacekeeping nation augment, but it may just yet win the rotating seat in the United Nations Security Council. Looking back at past situations, this may have been what Harper was trying to do with his introduction of maternal health issues at the G8 summit in Italy (see Idealism vs. Realism: G8 Summit).

In the end, I think that Canadian involvement in the African World War is just another example of how the HSA is being used as a superficial ideal goal to conceal and work towards achieving realistic motives. Although this strategy failed to function during the East Timor Crisis, I theorize that it may very well prove its worth in Africa’s World War.

Sources

[1] United Human Rights Council: Genocide in Rwanda

[2] BBC: Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo

[3] Geoffrey York. “The bleak calculus of Congo’s war without end.” The Globe and Mail, 26 March 2010.

[4] United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)

[5] Government of Canada – Congo: Development Cooperation

[6] The Globe and Mail: Michaëlle Jean arrives in Congo as speculation swirls over Canada’s role

[7] The Globe and Mail: Canada rejects UN request to lead Congo mission

[8] BBC News: Human cost of mining in DR Congo

[9] Government of Canada – Congo: Democratic Republic of Congo Relations

Human Security Agenda: East Timor Crisis of 1999

Introduction

Human security is a concept in which foreign policy revolves around people. These people’s rights, safety, and lives must be protected from threats. Such protection ensures long-term stability. [1] The human security agenda (HSA) is the pragmatic application of this idea, and favours the security of people rather than the security of state. [2]

In The Limits of the Human Security Agenda, T. S. Hataley and Richard Nossal concluded that although the HSA is successful in theory, much difficulty has been encountered when trying to bring it into practice. [2] An example of this is Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s and how it related to the East Timor Crisis.

The Problem

In 1975, Indonesia had invaded East Timor, and for almost 25 years, Indonesian paramilitary ruled via violence and human rights abuse. [3] In August 1999, a vote was held in East Timor for independence. Up to and throughout the voting procedure, however, violent paramilitary activity increased in an effort to discourage voting and postpone elections. [3]

Ultimately, more than 75% of the population voted for this independence, and in October, the vote was ratified by the Indonesian legislature. [3] In response, Jakarta declared martial law, sparking a paramilitary rampage that included murder, rape, and pillage. [3] Attention of this abomination was then brought to the international community so that it would intervene in this crisis. One of the nations that responded was Canada.

Canadian Foreign Policy and Response

During the 1990s, the HSA was centric to Canadian foreign policy. [2] This effort was spearheaded by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy had a negative response towards the East Timor Crisis and, under the HSA, vouched for Canadian involvement in East Timor as part of an international peacekeeping force, International Force East Timor (INTERFET). [2]

On September 7th, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that Canada only be willing to commit a small force of peacekeepers. Chrétien claimed this force would consist of 600 troops, receiving criticism for the apparent insufficiency of troops. However, he had used the term ‘troops’ synonymously with ‘personnel’, which can refer to the collective military instead of just the infantry ground forces.

Canada’s actual force would include: [1]

> 250 naval personnel

> 100 aircrew

> 50 logistical and medical support

> 200 infantry

On September 15th, the United Nations Security Council’s approval of Resolution 1264 (1999) [PDF] allowed Canada to effectuate its contribution. [1] However, the Canadian military would only arrive on October 27th, 1999 – much later than the Australian force, which had come on September 20th, 1999. [1]

The Application of the HSA

Ultimately, Canada’s experience in the East Timor Crisis shows that the HSA does not necessarily provide a good foundation for Canadian foreign policy. Not only was Canada very slow to respond and had few personnel to deploy, but it did not establish itself as a major contributor. More insight can be gained upon examination of the administration at the time.

Chrétien’s attitude as Prime Minister greatly slowed down the extent to which the HSA was applied. Although Axworthy was arguably supportive of the strategy (as can be deduced from his emotional response to the crisis), he was never able to convince Chrétien to integrate the HSA into his politics. This is evident from the small size of the force Chrétien deployed to East Timor. However, one might ask, why would Chrétien even agree to deploy personnel to East Timor given his lack of interest in the HSA as well as his general reluctance to utilize military force?

It is important to understand that Chrétien’s decision to send 600 personnel to East Timor was based three important factors. [4] The first is the ‘CNN effect’ which is a theory that the Cable News Network (CNN) has had a large impact on certain nations’ foreign policies via its (sensational) reporting of events. [1] Furthermore, many non-governmental organizations lobbied the government and informed citizens of the human rights abuses. [1] Finally, the international community had operatives in East Timor and was concerned for their safety. [1]

In reality, it appears that Chrétien’s choice was actually a public matter rather than a legitimate concern for human security. To me, the Canadian experience in East Timor seems to decry the efficiency of the HSA. However, as is clear from the analysis, its application depends on the ruling Canadian administration, and so the HSA could potentially be successful under a Prime Minister other than Chrétien.

Machiavelli’s Return

Could Chrétien’s policy have been based on Machiavelli’s ideas? By deploying troops to East Timor and by appealing to the public’s demand of human rights enforcement, Chrétien was possibly making a good image of himself and Canada. This can be expanded by his announcement to send 600 troops – a feat that would have made Canada a much larger contributor than it was. However, this Machiavellian tactic of appearing humane (see The President’s Princedom) wasn’t necessarily successful, as it met much criticism. For example, Reform Party defence critic Art Hanger said:

“The prime minister is picking numbers from his hat and making outrageous promises to bolster his own ego on the world stage …” [5]

Chrétien was also trying to make himself look good in a way that would involve Canada less than was necessary. Referring to the delay of the Canadian military’s arrival, Hataley and Nossal theorize that Canada was attempting to minimize its casualties and was waiting for other INTERFET contributors to scope out East Timor before its arrival. [2] Overall, I find that this shows the potential use of the HSA as a tool of realism under the discipline of Machiavelli, rather than a guiding idealistic principle.

Sources

[1] Michaud, Nelson. Ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha. “Values and Canadian Foreign Policy-making: Inspiration or Hindrance?” Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007: 344.

[2] T.S. Hataley and Kim Richard Nossal. “The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada’s Response to the Timor Crisis.” Global Change, Peace & Security 16, no. 1 (2004): 6-17.

[3] Global Issues: What Happened in East Timor?

[4] Robinson, Geoffrey. “If You Leave Us, We Will Die.” Dissent (Winter 2002), 89; as found in [1].

[5] CTV-TV. “The Continuing Violence in East Timor.” National News (13 September 1999); as found in [1].

The President's Princedom

In the past, many great minds have constructed theories that hold up to this day. In the field of politics, one such great mind was Niccolò Machiavelli. His ideas on political science, most notably The Prince (1513), are still being applied today, although not in an obvious manner. However, by extensive investigation of political figures and their actions, it is indubitable that Machiavellian ideas are still applied. A prominent example of such a figure is Barack Obama, and more specifically, his speech at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, on December 1st, 2009.

Obama commenced his monologue with stating its purpose:

“I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan – the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my Administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It is an honor for me to do so here – at West Point – where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.” [1]

His vocabulary, most notably phrases like “the scope of our interests” and “stand up for our security”, immediately sets the realistic stage for Machiavelli’s principles to play their roles.

A key strategy that Obama uses in his speech is appearing to be humane and benevolent, periodically speaking of things with an idealistic nature. Machiavelli himself theorized:

“... it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and upright… Everyone sees what you seem, but few know what you are, and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to back them up.” [2]

The most notable portion of Obama’s speech which portrays this attitude is:

“… I want the Afghan people to understand – American seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.” [1]

Of course, how can one be certain that this is what Obama actually wants? Even if the United States leaves Afghanistan by 2011, it does not mean that it will not retain diplomatic and perhaps even economic links with Afghanistan. Afghanistan may very well become an American node of operation and control in the Middle East. Furthermore, even if this is not the case, the American effort in Afghanistan (which Obama plans to augment by deploying an additional 30,000 troops [1]) may very well serve to strengthen the United States’ international reputation.

From this, light begins to shine down on Obama’s realpolitik. He dictated:

“… by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. … Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30-billion for the military this year, and I will work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.” [1]

Why would Obama seek to continue the war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of moralpolitik if the costs that the United States have spent and plans to spend are so high? This seems even more absurd considering Obama cited a financial deficit. One would think that such wealth would be better spent on ongoing domestic issues, as seems to be the general consensus. It is therefore very likely that America has a concealed objective in the Middle East, and furthermore, it is evident that Obama achieving this via his use of Machiavellian principles.

In various parts of his speech, several of Machiavelli’s minor techniques can be found. Machiavelli, for example, postulated:

“If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared.” [2]

Obama’s attitude reflects this concept when he said:

“Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten American and our allies in the future.” [1]

Naturally, if the United States is planning to have certain relations with the Middle East, as I conceptualized earlier, then staying true to this Machiavellian thought is essential.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that Obama has used and still uses Machiavellian principles. What is intriguing about analysing his ideology is that it can give insight into the realistic nature of his politics and how that sets the general direction of American politics under his presidency.

What do you VogueFascinists think?

Sources

[1] Barack Obama’s Speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York on December 1st, 2009

[2] Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. 1513. as found in Ed. Burger, Michael. Sources for the History of Western Civilization: Volume II. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

Further Resources

Full Text of Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince (1513)

Idealism vs. Realism: Michael Ignatieff

Introduction

Michael Ignatieff, current leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, is often decried by his opponents and even by his fellow liberals at times. Such criticism arises because of the many interesting ideologies Ignatieff follows, with which many disagree. Such ideologies are very deeply rooted into idealism and include cosmopolitanism, liberal democracy, and liberal interventionism. I aim to examine his viewpoint and formulate an opinion to see whether I agree or disagree with it. [1]

Cosmopolitanism, Communitarianism, and Post-Modernism

I do not fully support cosmopolitanism, and nor do I fully support its oppositional concept, communitarianism. Instead, I blend these two ideologies utilizing post-modernist politics. Consider, for example, the following premises.

Cosmopolitanism: The idea that all humans, whether fellow citizens or strangers, have a moral obligation to each other in terms of human rights and international justice. [1]

Communitarianism: Humans only have a moral obligation towards members of their own nation. [1]

Post-Modernism: There is no objective standard of morality in international politics. [1]

Given these definitions, it is clear that cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are both idealistic in nature – they each involve the exercising of morality. However, under the lens of post-modernism, we are able to put aside the idealistic portion and consider the realistic dimension of these two ideologies.

Being a realist, I strongly feel that a nation's interests must come first. Although it would be benevolent to aid a country in need, it is imperative that one first asserts the benefits and risks associated with lending aid. If the benefits outweigh the risks, then assistance should be provided to the nation in need. However, if there are far too many dangers lying in wait for intervening states, then it would be best to sit out on the conflict so that energy, resources, and time are conserved. In his biography of Ignatieff, Michael C. Morgan likewise says:

"Cosmopolitanism requires a solid foundation if it hopes to mobilize governments. Sympathy alone is insufficient." [1]

I theorize that such a “solid foundation” is directly proportional to how much a nation is interested in and fulfills its own interests. This suggests that in order to achieve an idealistic goal in today’s politics, one must use realistic methods to do so. As we will see soon, this is exactly what Ignatieff believes in.

Liberal Interventionism and the Lesser Evil

“It is meaningless to proclaim the importance of human rights unless one is willing to fight when they are threatened, and a sincere commitment to preventing genocide demands nothing less.” [1]

Liberal interventionism is the idea that military action should be used, when necessary, to protect ideals like democracy and human rights. This is the point where Ignatieff embraces imperfection and where his theory of the "lesser evil" comes into play.

The lesser evil is a concept that posits that when no possible political decisions are completely moral, one must make the least harmful choice. [1] What is interesting about this theory and liberal interventionism is that they both involve the blending of idealism and realism. A liberal interventionist sets an idealistic goal, but works towards it in a realistic manner.

I find myself agreeing with liberal interventionism and the lesser evil. I believe that moral principles often require force to be protected. However, from this, an issue arises - that the use of force is counter-idealistic because it involves the violation of others' rights. The lesser evil is a response to this problem. In such a scenario, I feel that it is necessary to violate the rights of someone who is violating the rights of innocent others in order to stop them. Afterwards, order may be brought in and the situation may be stabilized.

If a group of persons violating the rights of another group are not stopped, they may acquire enough power to form a tyrannical regime that, for example, engages in genocide. At this stage, this organization is much more difficult to stop and far more dangerous to idealism than it was at an earlier stage. A good example of this is the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a humanitarian terror that has been widely underreported, but yet, is in a more critical state than both Afghanistan and Iraq combined. [2]

The Applications of Ignatieff’s Ideology

There is no doubt that Ignatieff’s policies are perfect for an idealistic realm. However, this is not our world of political affairs today. Few politicians adopt the concepts outlined above that characterize him. [1] He is no doubt credible for trying to bring this idealism into a realistic world and ground it therein by conforming it to realistic principles. However, the magnitude of this idealism is too impractical and is perhaps why Ignatieff has not yet been successful against the Conservatives.

Conclusively, I find Ignatieff’s policies to be an extensive and unique case study in the rhetorical battle between realism and idealism. As I wrote earlier, I am a realist and hence, I disagree with Ignatieff's aims. Nevertheless, I respect him for accepting non-perfectionism, unlike many other idealists. It is this non-perfectionism that leads him to understand that it is necessary to aim for idealistic goals in a pragmatic manner. Because Ignatieff is not only looking at what is ideal, but is also looking at what truly works in contemporary politics, I think his ideas have much more credibility than your average idealist.

[1] Morgan, Michael C. “Michael Ignatieff: Idealism and the Challenge of the ‘Lesser Evil.” International Journal 61, no. 4 (2006): 972-979.

[2] Geoffrey York. “The bleak calculus of Congo’s war without end.” The Globe and Mail, 26 March 2010.

A Criticism of Systemic-centric Theorism: Part 3 – Expansion, Case Study, and Conclusion

Now that we've reached the end of theory, it is necessary that the theory be put into practice. Before doing so, there are two terms I would like to introduce as a side note to be able to be more specific later on.

The initial cause of an event is the level in which it first begins to manifest itself.

The direct cause of an event is the level(s) in which it actually occurs.

With this terminology defined, the case study can now be approached, in which Adolf Hitler, the rise of Nazi Germany, and World War II will be examined in relation to the theory outlined in the past two posts.

A question commonly proposed is, “Did Hitler initiate World War II?” A systemic theorist would disagree. They would instead typically conclude that World War II was ultimately caused by the international pressure present in the systemic level during that time period.

According to my theory, Hitler did initiate World War II. The systemic theorist considers neither the domestic level nor the individual level – his scope is narrow and his details are limited to the bigger picture. Adolf Hitler began at the individual level of analysis, where he formed his political ideology – Nazism. Nazism was based on Benito Mussolini’s fascism. Already, there is evidence for my theory – Hitler is an individual that spawns from a systemic layer of analysis, and is subject to its influence. In this case, Mussolini was already part of this systemic level and so, his fascism was a large component of its influence on Hitler.

Adolf Hitler proceeded to project his power into the domestic level, initiating the rise of Nazi Germany. In this locus, he expanded his ideology of Nazism and spread it amongst the German people. Nazism, however, included interaction with other nations, so Hitler used the domestic level to project his power and ideology into the systemic level. This caused a significant amount of international pressure and ultimately contributed to the initiation of World War II.

Thus, unlike the systemic theorist, who would say that World War II was an S issue, I would claim it to be an I → D → S issue.

In terms of the causes defined earlier,

The initial cause of both the rise of Nazi Germany and World War II occurred by Hitler at I.

The direct cause of the rise of Nazi Germany occurred by Hitler at D.

The direct cause of World War II occurred by Hitler at S.

Ultimately, as a general statement and proof,

If it can be said, as an example, that Adolf Hitler → The Rise of Nazi Germany → World War II, then it can also be said that I → D → S.

A Criticism of Systemic-centric Theorism: Part 2 – Advanced Mechanics

Before we delve into the importance of the individual and domestic levels relative to the systemic level, we need to look at their respective compositions. These can be summarized by two small diagrams as follows.

Figure 1. The deconstruction of the individual level of analysis, 

where x, y, and z, are subordinates that the individual projects their power through.

Figure 2. The deconstruction of the domestic level of analysis, 

where I1, I2, and I3, are individuals that influence the domestic state. 
Each individual has their respective x, y, and z subordinates as described above.

Now that this is established, it becomes possible to progress to the advanced mechanics of the individual-domestic-systemic political structure.

Stage 1

Individuals in various nations project their power and transmit it throughout said nation. They do so with the aid of their subordinates. This establishes the relation of I→ D as covered in the previous post. This collection of individually-influenced domestic levels constitutes a systemic level. This can also be expressed as D→ S. Thus, we return to the thesis of the previous post, being I→ D→ S1.

Figure 3. A graphical depiction of the first stage.

Stage 2

In this new systemic level, more individuals in their respective nations rise to project power via the aid of their subordinates. These individuals are subject to any influences already present in this systemic level, which can be traced back to the original individuals and nations that formed it. We can represent this as S1: I→ D. The individuals then project their power through the domestic level into the systemic layer, causing change. This is portrayable by S1: D→ S. Once more, we arrive at S1: I→ D→ S.

Figure 4. A graphical depiction of the second stage.

Stage 3

As mentioned, this collective influence causes a change that creates a new systemic level: S1→ S2. The old systemic level becomes historical, but is now somewhat irrelevant. Note that in the new systemic level, the entire process repeats. All individuals and nations in this stage are influenced by all the individuals and nations who contributed to shaping the new systemic level. Therefore, throughout history, the present course of events is collectively influenced by everything that shaped its current systemic level.

Figure 5. A graphical depiction of the third stage.

Ultimately, these mechanics also demonstrate the relevance of the individual and domestic levels and how they form the systemic level. They also depict how the systemic layer does not remain constant and in fact, changes. What defines a change is vague, but there are various historical events that set them apart. This topic will be explored in the third and final post of this critical series.